

INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE

April 2, 2020
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TO: The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners

FROM: Chief of Police

SUBJECT: OFFICER INVOLVED SHOOTING FID NO. 026-19

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Honorable Members:

The following is my review, analysis, and findings for Officer Involved Shooting (OIS), Force Investigation Division (FID) No. 026-19. A Use of Force Review Board (UOFRB) was convened on this matter on March 16, 2020. I have reviewed and adopted the recommendations from the UOFRB for this incident. I hereby submit my findings in accordance with Police Commission policy.

SUMMARY¹

On June 6, 2019, at approximately 1206 hours, Communications Division (CD) broadcast on Northeast Division Frequency, "Northeast Units, 415 man with a knife. Brunswick and Appleton. Suspect is a male Black with a curly afro-style hair... hair style suspect wearing a black long sleeve shirt and blue jeans, chasing passersby with possibly a razor blade or a box cutter, Code 3, incident 2569, in RD 1123, requesting Code Sam equipped unit and supervisor."

At approximately 1207 hours, CD broadcast an additional call, "Northeast Units, attempt ADW just occurred 3959 Edenhurst Avenue, occurred two blocks east of the location. Suspect is a male Hispanic, mid to late 40's, fit, dark hair, wearing a black long sleeve sweater, dark pants, armed with a yellow box cutter, it's Code 2, incident 2580, in RD 1123."

At approximately 1208 hours, Officers A. Cervantes, Serial No. 36807, and E. Martinez, Serial No. 36860, Northeast Patrol Division, were in full uniform, driving a marked black and white police vehicle.² They notified CD that they were responding Code-Three to the Attempt Assault with a Deadly (ADW) radio call. At approximately 1209 hours, CD inquired if the officers were *Code Sam or Code Sam 40 equipped*, to which Officer Martinez broadcast that they were.

¹ The summary and the investigation completed by FID for this incident have been provided to the Board of Police Commissioners.

² Officers Cervantes and Martinez had worked together numerous times in the past in other patrol divisions as well as their current division. Officers Cervantes and Martinez had in previous conversations discussed general tactics including contact and cover roles, foot pursuits, traffic stops, and suspects armed with handguns or knives.

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According to Officer Cervantes, while enroute to the call, he discussed with Officer Martinez that based on the multiple radio calls of a man with a box cutter or some sharp object, *creating distance* would be Officer Cervantes' primary focus. Additionally, Officer Martinez was designated as the less-lethal cover officer who would *deploy the 40-millimeter less-lethal launcher* if necessary.³

Officers P. Bernd, Serial No. 36841 and D. Rodriguez, Serial No. 43547, Northeast Patrol Division, responded Code-Three to the radio call to assist Officers Cervantes and Martinez.⁴ Additionally, Sergeant D. Sanchez, Serial No. 38115, Northeast Patrol Division, also broadcast he was enroute to the radio call. Communications Division determined that the two radio calls of a man with a knife and an attempted ADW were related and correspondingly assigned Officers Cervantes and Martinez the second call.

According to the FID investigation, at approximately 1215 hours, Officer Martinez broadcast they were Code-Six on the radio call.⁵ Officers Cervantes and Martinez were approached by Victim A. Alaniz, who advised that he had observed a male, later identified as Suspect J. De Santiago-Medina (herein referred to as Medina), chasing another person (later identified as Victim Y. Belhadi). Medina then approached Alaniz with a box cutter and proceeded to chase Alaniz. Officers Martinez and Cervantes then continued driving north on the street and were approached by Belhadi, who advised them that he had been approached by Medina and that Medina had attempted to cut him with a yellow box cutter. Officer Cervantes advised both Alaniz and Belhadi to remain where they were while Officer Cervantes and Martinez searched the area for Medina (**Additional Tactical Debrief Topic – Initiating Contact While Seated in Police Car and Completion of Investigative Report**).

According to Officer Cervantes, Alaniz stated he had been chased by Medina who was armed with a *box cutter*. Alaniz advised that he was only able to avoid being cut *because he ran away from him* (Medina). Alaniz directed Officer Cervantes and Martinez by *pointing* in a *southbound direction* which was the direction he had observed Medina walking. Belhadi narrated a similar encounter in which Medina was armed with a yellow box cutter and made a *jabbing motion like if the guy* (Medina) *was going to stab him*. Additionally, Belhadi described Medina as male Hispanic, about 5 feet 10 inches tall, wearing a long sleeve thermal sweater, armed with a yellow box cutter that had a yellow sheath (**Additional Tactical Debrief Topic – Supplemental Information Broadcast**).

³ Officers Cervantes and Martinez donned latex gloves while enroute to the radio call. According to Officer Martinez, both he and Officer Cervantes put on gloves to *keep themselves* protected in case they are exposed to blood or other *blood borne pathogens*.

⁴ According to Officer Rodriguez, he and Officer Bernd had worked approximately 15 prior times in the past and discussed tactics related to *situations* where less-lethal options may be needed. They also discussed the different less lethal force *options* that may be used as well as the circumstances that need to be taken into *consideration with a radio call of armed suspects*. Officer Bernd had designated himself as the *lethal* cover officer for the day while Officer Rodriguez was assigned as the *less-lethal* cover officer. These roles were reaffirmed while Officer Bernd and Rodriguez were enroute to the radio call.

⁵ The Code-Six broadcast time was gleaned from Officer Martinez' BWV and confirmed by the FID investigator.

Officer Cervantes drove north on Edenhurst Avenue where he stopped and met with Officers Bernd and Rodriguez who had arrived in the area and were driving south on Edenhurst Avenue. Officer Cervantes and Martinez informed Officers Bernd and Rodriguez that they had met with Alaniz and Belhadi, who stated Medina was armed and had chased after them. Officer Bernd advised Officers Cervantes and Martinez that he had searched to the north of their current location, but had not located Medina [**Additional Tactical Debrief Topic – Situational Awareness (Airship request)**].

According to Officer Bernd, Officer Cervantes and Martinez stated they had spoken to Alaniz and Belhadi and *verified* that a *legitimate crime* had been committed. Officer Bernd was advised that Medina had *chased* Alaniz and Belhadi and was armed with a *knife*. Officer Bernd believed that based on the information provided by Officers Cervantes and Martinez, an *ADW* had occurred.

According to the FID investigation, after speaking with Officers Cervantes and Martinez, Officers Bernd and Rodriguez were contacted by Witness M. Freeman, who provided them a description of Medina, as well as his last known location (**Additional Tactical Debrief Topic – Initiating Contact While Seated in Police Car**).

According to the FID investigation, Officers Bernd and Rodriguez continued south on Edenhurst Avenue as Officers Cervantes and Martinez conducted a U-turn and followed behind them. As Officer Bernd and Rodriguez continued south on Edenhurst Avenue and passed Dover Street, they were contacted by Alaniz who stated, "I was the other guy that got chased too." Alaniz pointed in a southern direction and advised that was the direction Medina was headed. Officers Cervantes and Martinez, who were following behind Officers Bernd and Martinez, were contacted by Belhadi who stated, "It kind of looks like this guy up here on the left. I can't tell from here but that's kind of what he was wearing." Officers Cervantes and Martinez, while continuing south on Edenhurst Avenue behind Officers Bernd and Rodriguez, observed Medina walking north on the east sidewalk of Edenhurst Avenue. Officer Cervantes conducted a U-turn as Officer Martinez broadcast, "11A25, turn around and come back northbound," indicating for Officers Bernd and Rodriguez to turn around and follow them. Officers Cervantes and Martinez initiated a pedestrian stop of Medina as Officers Bernd and Rodriguez conducted a U-turn and proceeded to follow behind them.

Note: The investigation revealed Medina was standing within a few feet of an individual on the sidewalk in front of 3865 Edenhurst Avenue.

According to Officer Cervantes, as he and Officer Martinez continued south on Edenhurst Avenue, they observed Medina *walking northbound* on the *east side* of Edenhurst Avenue. As Officers Cervantes and Martinez *passed by* Medina, Medina *looked back at* the officers numerous times as if he *knew we (officers) were looking for him*. Officer Cervantes conducted his U-turn and began *approaching* Medina when he observed a *female on the sidewalk* that Medina appeared to be *making contact with*. Based on Officer Cervantes' knowledge of Medina's aggressive behavior and that Medina was armed with a weapon, Officer Cervantes

believed Medina *may harm other citizens that were in the area*, and immediately stopped his vehicle to *detain* Medina.

Note: The investigation revealed the female that Officer Cervantes referred to was identified as male Witness S. Sanchez who was later interviewed by FID investigators.

According to the FID investigation, at approximately 12:22:43 hours, Officer Martinez broadcast, "11A1, we're going to be Code-Six on a possible suspect in front of 3865 Edenhurst." Officer Cervantes stopped his police vehicle, facing in a northeast direction, approximately 30 feet from Medina as Medina turned towards them. Officer Martinez exited his police vehicle, took a position of cover behind his vehicle door, drew his service pistol, and stated, "Turn around, let me see your hands. Turn around, let me see your hands. Turn around, face away from me."

According to Officer Martinez, he deployed out of the passenger side of his police vehicle and was the cover officer. He drew his service pistol immediately upon exiting his police vehicle based on his knowledge from speaking with Alaniz and Belhadi, as well as the comments of the call, which had informed him that Medina was *armed with a yellow box cutter*. Officer Martinez believed the *tactical situation* could escalate to the use of deadly force. Officer Martinez observed Medina was *unarmed*, but was not fully complying. Medina *started to comply by raising his hands*, but he was giving officers a *blank stare* and not complying with additional commands (**Drawing/Exhibiting**).

According to the FID investigation, Medina raised his hands above his head, but was otherwise non-responsive.⁶ Officers Bernd and Rodriguez arrived and stopped their police vehicle offset and behind Officers Cervantes' police vehicle. Officer Cervantes requested Officer Bernd and Rodriguez deploy a 40mm Less-Lethal Launcher (LLL) and then deployed to an area slightly in front of the left front bumper area of his police vehicle (**Debriefing Point No. 1**).

Note: The FID investigation revealed Officers Bernd and Rodriguez did not have a 40mm LLL, however they did have a beanbag shotgun inside of their vehicle.

According to the FID investigation, Officer Bernd felt the safest less-lethal tool for a suspect with an edged weapon was the beanbag shotgun, which would allow for distance between Medina and the officers. Officer Bernd directed Officer Rodriguez to deploy their beanbag shotgun and Officer Rodriguez retrieved it from their police vehicle. As Officer Rodriguez proceeded to the driver's side of Officer Cervantes's police vehicle, he chambered a round into the beanbag shotgun and took a position next to Officer Cervantes. Officer Bernd drew his service pistol and took a position of cover behind the passenger's side door of Officer Cervantes's police vehicle, and to the right of Officer Martinez. Officer Cervantes drew his service pistol as he stood slightly in front of the left front bumper of his police vehicle and began

⁶ According to Witness M. Hinojosa, Medina's wife, Medina had recently been suffering from hallucinations and was paranoid. Medina was under a doctor's care but had not yet been diagnosed with a mental illness. Hinojosa further stated that Medina had only been prescribed sleeping medication.

issuing commands to Medina [**Additional Tactical Debrief Topic – Beanbag Shotgun Manipulations and Situational Awareness – (Chamber Check)**].

According to Officer Bernd, he had received information from Officers Cervantes and Martinez that Medina had previously *chased two victims with a weapon* and had attempted to commit an Assault with a Deadly Weapon. Due to the *nature of the call*, a man *armed with a knife*, as well as his observation that Medina *was not completely complying* with the commands being given by Officers Cervantes and Martinez, Officer Bernd drew his service pistol to a low-ready position (**Drawing/Exhibiting** and **Additional Tactical Debrief Topic – Loading Standards**).

According to Officer Cervantes, he did not recall exactly when he drew his service pistol. However, he stated he drew his service pistol because he believed Medina *had a box cutter* and the *situation could escalate to the use of deadly force*. Additionally, Officer Cervantes believed he drew his service pistol out to a low-ready position. Officer Cervantes attempted to give *commands in Spanish and English* in order to determine *which one gets his (Medina) attention the most*. Medina *wasn't complying*, and Medina was *not going down to his knees* as Officers Cervantes and Martinez were commanding him to do. Officer Cervantes believed Medina *may be possibly under the influence of something* and observed a *bizarre look on his (Medina) face* (**Drawing/Exhibiting**).

According to the FID investigation, Officer Cervantes asked Medina two times in Spanish if he spoke English or Spanish to which Medina did not respond. Officer Cervantes instructed Officer Rodriguez to have the beanbag shotgun ready. Officer Rodriguez acknowledged Officer Cervantes and stated, "Beanbag's ready." Officers Cervantes and Martinez ordered Medina numerous times in Spanish to turn around. Medina, who was non-responsive to the commands, eventually turned to his right, away from the officers, in a northern direction. Officers Martinez and Rodriguez both ordered Medina in Spanish to come down to his knees (**Additional Tactical Debrief Topic – Non-Conflicting Simultaneous Commands**)

According to the FID investigation, Officers J. Zamorano, Serial No. 40411, and A. Guerrero, Serial No. 43797, Northeast Patrol Division, arrived at scene and stopped their police vehicle behind Officer Bernd's police vehicle. Officers Zamorano and Guerrero exited their police vehicle and initially took a position of cover behind Officer Bernd's police vehicle; however, they could not see Medina. Officers Zamorano and Guerrero repositioned themselves to the driver's side of Officers Cervantes' police vehicle.⁷

According to Officer Zamorano, she unholstered her service pistol after exiting her police vehicle based on the *comments of the radio call*, a man *armed with a weapon* chasing people, and due to the situation potentially leading to the use of deadly force (**Drawing/Exhibiting**).

⁷ Officer Zamorano advised she discussed tactics with Officer Guerrero while enroute to the call, which included Medina's *description, last known location, contact and cover, lethal, and less-lethal*. Officer Zamorano designated herself as the lethal cover officer and Officer Guerrero as the less-lethal cover officer if a beanbag shotgun was needed.

The FID investigation revealed that Medina, while facing north, lowered his right hand, then left hand, to reach into his rear waistband area. The object that Medina had reached for fell to the ground. Medina immediately squatted down and quickly picked up the object, identified as the yellow box cutter, with his left hand.

According to Officer Martinez, Medina made a *furtive movement* with his hand, *reaching* into his waistband. Officer Martinez did not observe a weapon; however, he knew from Alaniz and Belhadi's statements that Medina had been *armed with a yellow box cutter* and that it could be *concealed* somewhere on Medina. Officer Martinez communicated that Medina was *reaching in his pocket*; however, Officer Martinez advised he meant to say Medina was *reaching in his waistband* and was attempting to *arm himself*. Officer Martinez *wanted to de-escalate* the situation and prevent Medina from *possibly arming himself and charging at officers*. Officer Martinez believed the best option was to *hit him (Medina) with the beanbag*.

According to the FID investigation, Medina ran south on the sidewalk for a few steps and then changed direction and began running towards Officers Martinez and Bernd. Officer Rodriguez stated, "Beanbag ready, beanbag ready!" as he advanced a few steps out to his left from behind the left front fender of Officer Cervantes' police vehicle and covered Medina with the beanbag shotgun. Officer Cervantes moved back and stepped to his right behind the left front fender of his police vehicle, as Officer Rodriguez crossed in front of him. Multiple officers gave commands for Medina to cease his actions (**Additional Tactical Debrief Topic – Basic Firearm Safety Rules**).

Officer Zamorano broadcast a backup request as Officer Rodriguez fired one round from his beanbag shotgun and Officer Bernd fired one round from his service pistol. Medina was struck by both the beanbag and gunfire almost simultaneously and collapsed near the right front fender of Officers Cervantes and Martinez's vehicle [**Additional Tactical Debrief Topic – Situational Awareness (Background)**].

According to Officer Rodriguez, he observed Medina *arm himself with the knife* and begin *charging at the officers*. As Medina approached Officers Martinez and Bernd, Officer Rodriguez targeted Medina's *navel area* and discharged one round from his beanbag shotgun, due to Medina not *listening to commands* and *posing a threat* to Officers Martinez and Bernd. Officer Rodriguez believed Medina was approximately *five to seven feet away* from Officers Martinez and Bernd when Officer Rodriguez fired the beanbag round and deemed that Medina would have *caused serious bodily harm* to the officers if he had he not taken action. Officer Rodriguez stated that when Medina charged towards the officers, there was no opportunity to provide Medina a use of force warning (**Less-Lethal Use of Force and Additional Tactical Debrief Topic – Use of Force Warning**).

According to Officer Bernd, he observed Medina not fully complying with commands being provided by Officers Cervantes and Martinez, which included him *continuing to drop his hands*. Officer Bernd observed Medina *reach behind his back into his rear waistband* and drop an object on the floor. Medina *picked up the item*, which Officer Bernd *recognized as a yellow box cutter*. Medina immediately began to run *straight towards* Officer Bernd and Officer Martinez

with the box cutter *pointed* at them. Officer Bernd believed that he and Officer Martinez would be *seriously injured or killed*. Officer Bernd fired one round from his service pistol as Medina *charged* towards them, to defend his own life and Officer Martinez' life. Officer Bernd stated Medina had closed to an *unsafe* distance and believed there was *no time* to redeploy or utilize any other options because Medina was *closing the distance too quickly*. Officer Bernd *assessed* after he fired and observed Medina fall to the ground, no longer posing a lethal threat (**Lethal Use of Force**).

During the UOFRB, FID investigators presented that Medina began to arm himself with the box cutter approximately 57 seconds after first arrival of officers. When Medina charged the officers, Medina traveled approximately 16 feet in approximately two seconds.

According to Officer Guerrero, she drew her service pistol to a low-ready position after she heard gunfire (**Drawing/Exhibiting**).

According to the FID investigation, none of the officers at scene observed Officer Bernd discharge his service pistol and only Officer Guerrero was certain she had heard gunfire. Officer Cervantes repositioned to the front of his vehicle as he and the remaining officers approached Medina. Officer Cervantes observed the box cutter *still at arm's reach* of Medina and directed officers to *kick it out of the way*. Officer Bernd observed that Medina's hand was *still close to it* (box cutter) as officers *approached to handcuff* Medina. Officer Bernd *wanted the weapon away from him* and kicked it away and out of his reach. Officer Zamorano asked if only a beanbag shotgun had been fired or if any officers had fired their service pistols. Officer Bernd responded, "Shots fired," and Officer Rodriguez advised, "Beanbag." Officer Zamorano broadcasted a Help Call request on Northeast Division Frequency for the OIS (**Additional Tactical Debrief Topic – Tactical Communication and Preservation of Evidence**).

According to the FID investigation, Officer Zamorano directed officers to approach Medina and reposition him so Medina could be handcuffed. All of the officers at scene observed that Medina was bleeding profusely. Officers Cervantes and Martinez, who had already donned latex gloves, holstered their service pistols, rolled Medina onto his stomach, and completed the handcuffing process. Officer Zamorano held her pistol in a one-handed grip, down her right side, as she grasped Medina's right arm with her left hand and assisted Officers Cervantes and Martinez to roll Medina onto his stomach. Officer Zamorano then holstered her service pistol. Officer Bernd provided lethal cover with his service pistol drawn until Medina was handcuffed. The FID investigation revealed Medina was repositioned onto his back after he was handcuffed; however, a pat down search of Medina was not conducted by officers at scene (**Debriefing Point No. 2 and Additional Tactical Debrief Topic – Initiating physical contact holding service pistol**).

According to the FID investigation, at approximately 12:24:29 hours, Officer Zamorano broadcasted a request for a Rescue Ambulance (RA) to respond and treat Medina's wounds. Officer Zamorano also broadcast that all officers were accounted for, and that Medina was in custody. Officer Zamorano verified that Officer Rodriguez had fired his beanbag shotgun and Officer Bernd had fired his service pistol. Additionally, she broadcast a request for supervisors

to respond to their location. Officer Bernd directed Officer Rodriguez to secure his beanbag shotgun and move their police vehicle in order to clear a path for the RA to respond. Officer Rodriguez secured his beanbag shotgun in the trunk of his police vehicle and moved his police vehicle to the west side of Edenhurst Avenue.

According to the FID investigation, Officer Zamorano directed Officer Guerrero to retrieve her medical supplies. Officer Guerrero retrieved an Individual First Aid Kit (IFAK) from the trunk of her vehicle and removed chest seals from the IFAK. Officer Guerrero handed one of the seals to Officer Cervantes who placed the chest seal over Medina's chest wound. As Officers Cervantes, Martinez, Zamorano, and Guerrero stood together near Medina's body and waited for the RA, they had a brief conversation with each other in regard to their positioning and how the incident unfolded. Additionally, Officers Zamorano and Guerrero made telephone calls to personal associates, advising them they were involved in an OIS (**Additional Tactical Debrief Topic – Protocols Subsequent To a Categorical Use of Force**).

According to the FID investigation, Detective A. Koenig, Serial No. 30289, Northeast Area, was the first supervisor to arrive at scene. Upon his arrival, he directed a crime scene to be established and located the involved officers. He determined Officer Bernd was the officer directly involved in the OIS and separated, monitored, and administered a Public Safety Statement (PSS) to Officer Bernd. Detective Koenig believed he was the Incident Commander (IC) due to him being the first supervisor on scene; however he did not verbally declare himself as the IC and did not admonish the other involved officers not to discuss the incident.

According to the FID investigation, Sergeant D. Sanchez, Serial No. 38115, Northeast Patrol Division, arrived at scene shortly after Detective Koenig, and established control of the crime scene. Sergeant Sanchez identified the five remaining officers who were involved in the incident who were standing near Medina's body. Sergeant Sanchez ordered them to stay in place and stand by for the RA, however he did not admonish them not to discuss the incident. Sergeant Sanchez then proceeded to interview Witness C. Dickson and obtained his information due to Dickson wanting to leave the location. Sergeant Sanchez later administered a PSS to Officer Rodriguez.

According to the FID investigation, the Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD), RA 35, was dispatched and arrived on scene at approximately 1234 hours. Rescue ambulance personnel assessed Medina's medical condition and pronounced him deceased at 1238 hours.

According to the FID investigation, Lieutenant R. Parks, Serial No. 26501, Northeast Patrol Division, responded to the scene and assumed the role of IC, but did not verbally declare that he was the IC. He began obtaining information regarding the separation, monitoring, and admonishment of the involved officers. Lieutenant Parks assured Officer Bernd had been separated and that a PSS had been conducted. He directed Sergeant Sanchez to administer a PSS to Officer Rodriguez. Lieutenant Parks then separated, monitored, and administered a PSS to Officer Martinez. Lieutenant Parks later directed Sergeant R. Mejia, Serial No. 35943, Northeast Patrol Division, to administer a PSS to Officer Guerrero. Lieutenant Parks also directed

Sergeant J. Gomez, Serial No. 33330, Northeast Patrol Division, to administer a PSS to Officer Zamorano.

Sergeant R. Arellano, Serial No. 32338, Northeast Patrol Division, separated and monitored Officer Cervantes.

According to the FID investigation, at approximately 1248 hours, the Department Operations Center was notified of the OIS by Captain A. Sandoval, Serial No. 27250, Commanding Officer, Northeast Area.

FINDINGS

Tactics – Tactical Debrief, Officers Cervantes, Martinez, Bernd, Rodriguez, Zamorano, and Guerrero.

Drawing/Exhibiting – In Policy, No Further Action, Officers Cervantes, Martinez, Bernd, Zamorano, and Guerrero.

Less-Lethal Use of Force – In policy, No Further Action, Officer Rodriguez.

Lethal Use of Force – In Policy, No Further Action, Officer Bernd.

ANALYSIS⁸

Detention

The involved officers responded to two radio calls involving a man armed with a knife. The officers spoke with the victims of the radio calls and verified that a crime had occurred. The victims directed the officers toward Medina's last location. The officers located the suspect and conducted a high-risk pedestrian stop and proceeded to order Medina to the ground. As officers continued to provide orders in English and in Spanish to the suspect, Medina reached into his rear waistband and armed himself with a box cutter. Medina charged at the officers with the box cutter in his hand, resulting in a less-lethal use of force and an OIS. The officers' actions were appropriate and within Department policies and procedures.

Tactics

Department policy relative to a Tactical Debrief is: *"The collective review of an incident to identify those areas where actions and decisions were effective and those areas where actions and decisions could have been improved. The intent of a Tactical Debrief is to enhance future performance."*

⁸ The analysis reflects my recommendations as supported by the preponderance of the evidence established by the investigation.

Department policy relative to Administrative Disapproval is: *"A finding, supported by a preponderance of the evidence that the tactics employed during a CUOF incident unjustifiably and substantially deviated from approved Department tactical training"* (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 792.05).

The evaluation of tactics requires that consideration be given to the fact that officers are forced to make split-second decisions under very stressful and dynamic circumstances. Tactics are conceptual and intended to be flexible and incident specific, which requires that each incident be looked at objectively and the tactics be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances.

Tactical De-Escalation

Tactical de-escalation involves the use of techniques to reduce the intensity of an encounter with a suspect and enable an officer to have additional options to gain voluntary compliance or mitigate the need to use a higher level of force while maintaining control of the situation.

Tactical De-Escalation Techniques

- *Planning*
- *Assessment*
- *Time*
- *Redeployment and/or Containment*
- *Other Resources*
- *Lines of Communication (Use of Force - Tactics Directive No. 16, October 2016, Tactical De-Escalation Techniques)*

Tactical de-escalation does not require that an officer compromise his or her safety or increase the risk of physical harm to the public. De-escalation techniques should only be used when it is safe and prudent to do so.

Planning – Officers Cervantes and Martinez had worked together multiple times in the past and had addressed general tactics including contact cover roles, foot pursuits, traffic stops, and suspects armed with handguns and knives. While enroute to the radio call, Officers Cervantes and Martinez discussed keeping distance from Medina and that Officer Cervantes would be the contact officer. Officer Martinez was designated as the officer who would deploy the 40mm LLL, if necessary. Additionally, both officers donned latex gloves in the event they would have to make physical contact with Medina. While enroute to the radio call, Officer Bernd designated himself as the lethal cover officer and Officer Rodriguez as the less-lethal cover officer with a beanbag shotgun. Officer Zamorano and Guerrero discussed tactics while enroute to the radio call and determined that Officer Zamorano would be the cover officer and Officer Guerrero would be the contact officer if they were the first to arrive and contact Medina. Additionally, Officer Zamorano and Guerrero determined that they would deploy a beanbag shotgun if one had not yet been deployed.

While the officers planned for their initial response to the incident, additional planning for other possibilities, such as a containment perimeter if Medina attempted to leave the densely residential area, would have been preferred. The UOFRB noted that while the officers focused on Medina's actions, the incident would have benefitted from additional planning for other possible outcomes.

Assessment – Officer Cervantes assessed the tactical situation immediately after conducting his pedestrian stop on Medina. Officer Cervantes requested Officers Bernd and Rodriguez to deploy a 40mm LLL⁹ due to Medina not immediately complying with the commands being provided by Officer Martinez, and the likelihood that Medina was armed with a box cutter. Both Officers Bernd (service pistol) and Rodriguez (beanbag shotgun) utilized fire control, immediately assessing after the round each fired to determine if Medina still presented an imminent threat. Officer Cervantes continued to assess after the OIS and directed officers to move the box cutter away from where it landed due to its close proximity to Medina's body. Officer Zamorano assessed the tactical situation immediately after the OIS and directed officers to handcuff and take Medina into custody as he was in close proximity to them and unsecured. Additionally, she requested an RA for Medina and determined that an OIS had occurred in addition to the discharge of a beanbag shotgun.

Time – Officers Cervantes and Martinez, after initiating their pedestrian stop on Medina, attempted to communicate with him in both English and Spanish while also maintaining their distance. As units arrived, a beanbag shotgun was deployed as an additional de-escalation tool to gain more time to safely resolve the incident. Medina, suddenly and without warning, rapidly escalated the incident, by reaching into his rear waistband and arming himself with a box cutter. Medina charged at Officers Martinez and Bernd who were positioned on the passenger side of Officer Cervantes' police vehicle. Medina held the box cutter pointed towards Officers Martinez and Bernd, in his left hand, as he charged towards them. Medina travelled approximately 18 feet in approximately two seconds. Officer Rodriguez stated he fired his beanbag shotgun from the driver's side of Officer Cervantes' police vehicle to stop the immediate deadly threat posed by Medina. Officer Bernd stated he fired his service pistol to protect himself and Officer Martinez from the deadly threat Medina presented. Medina's actions did not afford the officers any additional time to respond to his deadly actions, which reduced the time they had to respond, and significantly limited their tactical options.

Redeployment and/or Containment – Officers Cervantes and Martinez met with both Victims Alaniz and Belhadi upon their arrival in the area of the radio call and verified that Medina was armed with a box cutter and had attempted to assault both of them. After locating Medina, Officer Cervantes observed a female, later identified as Witness Sanchez, in close proximity to Medina. Based on the threat officers believed Medina presented to Sanchez and the community, they immediately stopped their police vehicle and attempted to detain Medina, which did not allow for containment to be properly established. While attempting to communicate with Medina and having him place himself into a prone position, Medina armed himself with a box

⁹ Officer Cervantes requested for Officers Bernd and Rodriguez to deploy a 40mm LLL. Officer Rodriguez deployed a beanbag shotgun instead, due to not having a 40mm LLL in their vehicle.

cutter and charged Officers Martinez and Bernd. Due to the speed in which Medina closed distance on Officers Martinez and Bernd, the officers had an extremely limited time in which to react to the lethal threat presented to them. Medina's actions, in which he rapidly closed to an unsafe distance armed with a box cutter, did not allow space for Officers Martinez or Bernd to redeploy from their positions.

Officers Zamorano and Guerrero initially took cover behind Officer's Bernd and Rodriguez police vehicle, however they redeployed to the driver's side of Officer's Cervantes and Martinez police vehicle in order to place themselves in a more advantages tactical position and to provide assistance.

Other Resources – Due to the nature of the radio calls, additional units broadcast they were responding to the radio call to support Officers Cervantes and Martinez. When Officers Cervantes and Martinez initially made contact with Medina, they did not observe Medina armed with a weapon, but believed he was possibly armed. They attempted to communicate with him and direct him to the ground. Less-lethal force options were considered, and a beanbag shotgun was deployed by Officer Rodriguez upon the request of Officer Cervantes. Officers Zamorano and Guerrero observed that Officer Rodriguez had already deployed a beanbag shotgun and made the determination not to deploy an additional less-lethal option at the time. Medina armed himself with a box cutter, ignored verbal commands to de-escalate, and charged the officers. Officer Rodriguez fired his beanbag shotgun and Officer Bernd fired his service pistol in response to Medina's lethal threat. Additionally, Officer Zamorano requested an RA to respond immediately after the OIS for Medina's injuries.

The UOFRB noted that while Officer Rodriguez deployed a beanbag shotgun, it would have been preferable for the deployment of an additional less-lethal force option. This would have been beneficial due to Medina being on the move and the unpredictable nature of his movements and changing of directions. This would have allowed for additional tactical options during the incident. It was noted that due to the rapid escalation of the incident by Medina and the reduction of the time available to the officers, the deployment of other force options was limited. Although there was a 40mm LLL located inside one of the police vehicles at the location, due to the proximity of the suspect and the rapid escalation of the incident, it was understandable that the 40mm LLL was not deployed due to the initial inability of the officers to access it. The officers were equipped with TASERS if the circumstances required the deployment of one. The incident may have also benefitted from the request for an air unit to respond to the location. This would have allowed for additional coordination of resources and also the tracking of Medina if he had gone mobile and attempted to leave the area.

Lines of Communication – Throughout the incident, officers utilized open lines of communication. Officers Cervantes and Martinez initially opened lines of communication with Officers Bernd and Rodriguez informing them of the crime that occurred and the weapon used based on the information they received from Victims Alaniz and Belhadi. Officers Cervantes and Martinez communicated to each other their observation of Medina walking north on the east side of Edenhurst Avenue. They communicated to Officers Bernd and Rodriguez to turn their police vehicle around to assist them with a possible suspect. Officers utilized both English and

Spanish commands to direct Medina to the ground. Additionally, officers attempted to communicate with Medina as he aggressively reached in the rear of his waistband to arm himself with a box cutter. Officers ordered Medina to put his hands up and “Stop” prior to the OIS occurring.

The UOFRB noted, and I concur, that due to the rapidly unfolding nature of this incident, the responding officers had limited time to react to the deadly actions of Medina. Officer Cervantes stated he observed Medina appear to be making contact with a female citizen (Witness Sanchez) and immediately attempted to detain him based on the crimes he had committed and his continuing danger to the community. Officers Cervantes and Martinez attempted to de-escalate the encounter by communicating with Medina in both English and Spanish in order to gain compliance and allow additional time to calmly resolve the incident. Officers also deployed a less-lethal force option in the event it became necessary. However, Medina suddenly and unexpectedly armed himself with a box cutter and began to charge at officers. The aggressive actions and lethal threat presented by Medina, extremely limited the time and options officers had, and forced them to react to the imminent lethal threat presented to them. Officers were required to make decisions that balanced the safety of the community and their own welfare while presented with an imminent lethal threat.

During the review of the incident, the following Debriefing Topics were noted:

Debriefing Point No. 1 Utilization of Cover

“Cover” is a term often associated with combat tactics. Under such conditions, cover refers to anything that may stop or deflect an opponent’s weapon (e.g., brick walls, buildings, portion of the vehicle with the engine block, etc.) (California Commission on Peace Officers Standards and Training, Learning Domain 21).

There is an equation that saves lives: Distance + Cover = Time. Time gives officers options. Time is an essential element of de-escalation as it allows officers the opportunity to communicate with the suspect, refine tactical plans, and, if necessary, call for additional resources. Entering the suspect’s space prematurely may force the suspect to take action, ultimately escalating the situation. Whenever possible, officers should place an object between themselves and the suspect as cover or a barrier. A barrier could be a chain link fence, wrought iron gate, or any similar object that prevents the assailant from reaching the officer (Los Angeles Police Department Training Bulletin, Weapons Other Than Firearms, Volume XLVI, Issue 3, October 2017).

The utilization of cover, coupled with distance, enables an officer to confront an armed suspect while simultaneously minimizing their exposure. As a result, the overall effectiveness of a tactical incident can be enhanced while also increasing an officer’s tactical options.

Officer Cervantes left a position of cover when he moved from the protection of his police vehicle.

In this case, upon exiting his police vehicle, Officer Cervantes moved away from his driver's door and in front of the left front fender of his police vehicle in order to get a better view of Medina and to also give commands for Medina to place himself into a prone position. The UOFRB noted Medina appeared to be unarmed at this time. There were a utility pole and a light pole between Officer Cervantes and where Medina was initially contacted which provided an obstacle.

Officer Cervantes stated he believed that the two poles were a barrier between him and Medina which would provide him sufficient time to move back the short distance to the cover of his police vehicle and react to a threat. Officer Cervantes believed he was in close proximity to his police vehicle and would be able to utilize the cover afforded by his police vehicle.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that while identified as an area for improvement, Officer's Cervantes actions were not a deviation from approved Department tactical training. In an effort to improve future performance, I will direct this to be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Debriefing Point No. 2 Searches of Arrestees

A peace officer's first goal when conducting a person search is to maximize their own personal safety. By following a systematic approach and process while conducting a person search, peace officers are less likely to overlook a potentially dangerous weapon.

A systematic search should include the most likely areas where a weapon might be hidden. This includes but is not limited to the subject's:

- *Front waistband*
- *Upper body (including the chest, front pockets, armpits, sleeves and sides)*
- *Back (including the rear waistband and buttocks) area*
- *Lower body (including the legs and ankles) (California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, Learning Domain 33).*

Officers are trained to conduct a search of arrestees to ensure that they are not armed with weapons and do not possess items of contraband on their person. This practice is necessary for the safety of not only the officers, but also medical personnel and the public.

Following the OIS, Officers Cervantes and Martinez did not search Medina for additional weapons that he may have possessed on his person.

The UOFRB noted, after the OIS, Medina fell to the ground and was virtually motionless. The box cutter that he was reportedly and observed to be armed with had fallen from Medina's grasp and was moved away from Medina. Officers immediately observed Medina was bleeding profusely and requested a RA to respond for Medina's injuries. Additionally, Officer Cervantes located the wound to Medina's chest and applied a chest seal from an IFAK provided by Officer Guerrero.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that the officers were focused on rendering aid to the suspect. As such, while identified as an area for improvement, their actions did not represent a deviation from approved Department tactical training. In an effort to improve future performance, I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Additional Tactical Debrief Topics

Initiating Contact While Seated in Police Car – The investigation revealed Officers Cervantes and Martinez initiated contact with unknown individuals, later identified as Victims Alaniz and Belhadi, while still seated in their police vehicle. Officers Bernd and Rodriguez initiated contact with another unknown individual who was in a vehicle, later identified as Witness Freeman, while still seated in their police vehicle. The officers are reminded of the importance of proper safety tactics when encountering pedestrian contacts, including the increased visibility and mobility provided by exiting their vehicles during these encounters. I will direct this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Supplemental Information Broadcast – The investigation revealed that Officers Cervantes and Martinez did not broadcast updated information regarding the crime committed by Medina, as well as a verified description of the box cutter he was armed with to responding officers. The officers are reminded that the omission of this information can create a circumstance wherein responding personnel are not fully aware of the circumstances of the evolving tactical situation they may be encountering. I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Situational Awareness (Airship request) – The investigation revealed Officers Cervantes and Martinez while attempting to locate Medina, did not request an available air unit to respond and assist with their search. Officers Cervantes and Martinez are reminded to utilize all available resources at their disposal in order to provide a situation of tactical advantage and ensure operational success. I will direct this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Situational Awareness (Chamber Check) – The investigation revealed Officer Cervantes chamber checked his service pistol after drawing it from his holster during the high-risk pedestrian stop of Medina. Officer Cervantes is reminded of the importance of ensuring the condition of his service pistol prior to deploying it in tactical situation in the field. I will direct this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Non-Conflicting Simultaneous Commands – The investigation revealed that several officers gave simultaneous commands to Medina prior to the OIS. Although the commands were non-conflicting, the officers are reminded that simultaneous commands can sometimes lead to confusion and non-compliance. I will direct this to be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Beanbag Shotgun Manipulations – The investigation revealed that during the incident, Officer Rodriguez disengaged the safety of the beanbag shotgun prior to intending to shoot. Officer

Rodriguez is reminded of the importance of proper beanbag shotgun manipulation during tactical situations and that the premature disengagement of the safety can increase the likelihood of an unintentional discharge. I will direct this topic be discussed during the Tactical Debrief.

Use of Force Warning – The investigation revealed that a Use of Force warning was not provided by officers at scene prior to Officer Rodriguez discharging the Beanbag Shotgun. Although in this case, Medina charged officers, limiting the time to provide the verbal warning. The officers are reminded of the importance of providing a Use of Force Warning, when feasible, prior to utilizing less-lethal control devices. In order to enhance future performance, I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Situational Awareness (Background) – The investigation revealed that Witness Sanchez was the possible female Officer Cervantes believed was contacted by Medina. At the time Medina was detained, Sanchez was not in the officers' background. As Medina moved south toward the officers, the background of Officer Rodriguez and Officer Cervantes began to angle in a southerly direction, to then include Sanchez. As Officer Rodriguez fired his beanbag shotgun at Medina, who was moving, Sanchez entered into his background. Additionally, Sanchez also entered the background of Officer Cervantes as Officer Cervantes tracked the movement of Medina with his service pistol. Although the issue of Sanchez being in the background of the officers was created by Medina's movements, the elimination of Sanchez from the location could have prevented this issue. Officers at scene did not identify and communicate to Sanchez to leave the area and move to a safer location. The officers are reminded to be mindful of their background during tactical encounters which may result in the use of deadly force and attempt to communicate with community members in the vicinity to leave the area for their safety. The removal of uninvolved community members also allows for officers to focus on handling the suspect without further distractions. I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Basic Firearms Safety Rules – The investigation revealed that Officer Cervantes briefly allowed the muzzle of his service pistol to cover Officer Rodriguez's back during the incident. Even though this incident was dynamic and fluid in nature, Officer Cervantes is reminded to remain mindful of the Department's Basic Firearm Safety Rules at all times. I will direct this to be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Tactical Communication – The investigation revealed that officers at scene did not communicate with each other prior to moving forward and handcuffing Medina. Officers are reminded of the importance of effective communication during a tactical incident to provide critical basic direction, reduce possible confusion, and improve operational success. I will direct this to be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Initiating physical contact holding service pistol – The investigation revealed that as Medina was being rolled onto his stomach, Officer Zamorano held her service pistol in a one-handed grip down to her right side. Officer Zamorano grasped Medina's right arm with her left hand to assist Officer Martinez with rolling Medina onto his stomach. Officer Zamorano holstered her service pistol after she assisted rolling Medina onto his stomach. Officer Zamorano is reminded that

initiating physical contact with a suspect, while holding a service pistol, may inhibit an officer's ability to utilize other force options or to de-escalate. There is also an increased risk the suspect could gain control of the service pistol. I will direct this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Preservation of Evidence – The investigation revealed that after the OIS, Officer Bernd kicked the box cutter a short distance away from where it fell, due to it being within arm's reach of Medina. In this case, the proximity in which the box cutter was in relation to Medina was a factor in immediately moving the box cutter. However, to enhance future performance, officers are reminded that whenever tactically feasible, it is preferable to have an uninvolved officer guard evidence and leave it undisturbed until FID investigators can properly document and preserve the scene. If evidence must be moved, officers should don appropriate personal protective equipment, such as latex gloves, to minimize altering or contaminating the evidence. I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Loading Standards – The investigation revealed Officer Bernd had loaded 11 rounds in the third magazine¹⁰ for his service pistol. The fully loaded capacity for the magazine was 13 rounds. Officer Bernd is reminded to ensure his magazines are loaded to Department standards prior to responding to an incident. I will direct this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Protocols Subsequent to a Categorical Use of Force – As Officers Cervantes, Martinez, Zamorano, and Guerrero stood together at scene after the OIS, waiting for the RA unit to respond, they had a brief conversation with each other in regard to their positioning and how the incident unfolded; however, they had not been separated or admonished not to discuss the incident by a supervisor. Additionally, Officers Zamorano and Guerrero made telephone calls to personal associates, advising them they were involved in an OIS. These calls were not made in the presence of a supervisor; however, they were made prior to the officers being separated and admonished not to discuss the incident. Officers are reminded of the importance of protocols subsequent to a Categorical Use of Force, specifically not discussing incident until interviewed by FID investigators. I will direct this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Completion of Investigative Report (IR) – The investigation revealed that during the initial response to the radio call, Officers Cervantes and Martinez did not initiate or complete an Investigative Report of the incident with either victim. The initiation and completion of the front face sheet of an IR allows for the documentation of important facts related to the actions of a suspect and the identity of the victim of crime. A signed IR also facilitates the deployment of additional resources, such as the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team, in the event the incident escalates to a barricaded suspect. Officers are reminded of the benefits of obtaining a signed IR from a victim. I will direct this to be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

¹⁰ The third magazine was the magazine in his magazine pouch on the farthest left (support side) position on his duty belt.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command and Control is the use of active leadership to direct others while using available resources to coordinate a response, accomplish tasks and minimize risk. Command uses active leadership to establish order, provide stability and structure, set objectives and create conditions under which the function of control can be achieved with minimal risk. Control implements the plan of action while continuously assessing the situation, making necessary adjustments, managing resources, managing the scope of the incident (containment), and evaluating whether existing Department protocols apply to the incident.

Command and Control is a process where designated personnel use active leadership to command others while using available resources to accomplish tasks and minimize risk. Active leadership provides clear, concise, and unambiguous communication to develop and implement a plan, direct personnel and manage resources. The senior officer or any person on scene who has gained sufficient situational awareness shall initiate Command and Control and develop a plan of action. Command and Control will provide direction, help manage resources, and make it possible to achieve the desired outcome. Early considerations of PATROL will assist with the Command and Control process (Los Angeles Police Department, Training Bulletin, Volume XLVII Issue 4, July 2018).

Line Supervision – Defined. A supervisor who has the specific responsibility of issuing directions and orders to designated subordinates shall be considered as having the duty of line supervisor and shall be held accountable for achieving conformance with the directions and orders that he/she issues (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 135).

Incident Commander (IC) – In accordance with Department Policy, the IC sets the objectives, the strategy and directs the tactical response. Directing the tactical response means applying tactics appropriate to the strategy, assigning the right resources and monitoring performance (Supervisor's Field Operations Guide, Volume 2, LAPD Emergency Operations Guide).

In reviewing this incident, the UOFRB acknowledged the complexity and chaotic nature of the incident. The UOFRB did note multiple positive steps taken by Officer Zamorano during the incident. However, the UOFRB was critical of the actions of Detective Koenig and Sergeant Sanchez who responded to the scene after the OIS with regards to the protocols subsequent to a categorical use of force. The UOFRB also conducted an analysis of Lieutenant Parks, and Sergeants Guerrero and Gomez' actions, who responded to the incident after the OIS.

The investigation revealed upon arrival, Officer Zamorano took proactive steps to assert command and control when she conducted an assessment and took on the role of the communications officer at the scene. While maintaining a visual of Medina, Officer Zamorano attempted to give commands for Medina to put his hands up and broadcasted a request for a backup. The OIS occurred during her broadcast at which time Officer Zamorano communicated with the other officers at scene to determine if an OIS had occurred. She took an active

leadership role, determined the roles of the officers involved, and maintained her role as the communications officer at the scene. Officer Zamorano broadcast a "help call" immediately after the OIS and updated Communications Division that Medina was in custody and all officers were accounted for. Additionally, shortly after the OIS, she requested for a RA to respond for Medina's wounds and for multiple supervisors to respond.

Officer Zamorano's actions were consistent with Department training and my expectations of a senior officer during a critical incident.

The investigation revealed Detective Koenig was the first supervisor to arrive at scene. He directed an officer to initiate a crime scene log and located the involved officers. Detective Koenig determined Officer Bernd was the officer directly involved in the OIS and separated him from the other officers. Detective Koenig directed Officer Bernd to turn off his BWV, took custody of the BWV, administered a PSS, and monitored him. Detective Koenig believed he was the IC due to him being the first supervisor on scene; however he did not verbally declare such and did not admonish the other involved officers not to discuss the incident.

Sergeant Sanchez arrived at scene and spoke briefly to Detective Koenig who advised he was taking a PSS from Officer Bernd. Sergeant Sanchez secured the crime scene, directing officers at scene to set up an inner and outer perimeter with crime scene tape. Additionally, Sergeant Sanchez identified the five remaining officers who were involved in the incident and standing near Medina's body. Sergeant Sanchez ordered them to stay in place and stand by for the RA, however he did not separate, monitor, or admonish them not to discuss the incident. Sergeant Sanchez then briefly interviewed Witness Dickson to obtain information due to Witness Dickson wanting to leave. Sergeant Sanchez later administered a PSS to Officer Rodriguez at the direction of Lieutenant Parks.

Lieutenant Parks assumed the role of the IC, but did not verbally declare himself as such. He responded to the scene and began to obtain information regarding the separation, monitoring, and admonishment of the involved officers. Lieutenant Parks assured Officer Bernd had been separated and that a PSS had been conducted. Lieutenant Parks directed Sergeant Sanchez to administer a PSS to Officer Rodriguez and then separated, monitored, and administered a PSS to Officer Martinez himself. Lieutenant Parks later directed Sergeant Mejia to administer a PSS to Officer Guerrero and Sergeant Gomez to administer a PSS to Officer Zamorano, which they did respectively.

The UOFRB noted that all supervisors responded to scene after the OIS had occurred and the tactical situation had concluded. UOFRB determined, and I concur, that while there were identified areas for improvement Detective Koenig and Sergeant Sanchez's actions with regard to protocols subsequent to a categorical use of force did not significantly deviate from approved Department supervisory training.

The actions of Sergeants Guerrero and Gomez were consistent with Department supervisory training and my expectations of field supervisors during a critical incident.

The actions of Lieutenant Parks were consistent with Department supervisory training and my expectations of a watch commander during a critical incident.

Tactical Debrief

In conducting an objective assessment of this case, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Officers Cervantes, Martinez, Bernd, Rodriguez, Zamorano and Guerrero's tactics did not substantially deviate from approved Department tactical training.

Each tactical incident also merits a comprehensive debriefing. In this case, there were identified areas where improvement could be made. A Tactical Debrief is the appropriate forum for the involved personnel to discuss individual actions that took place during this incident.

Although it was determined that Detective Koenig and Sergeant Sanchez would not receive formal findings, I believe that they would benefit from attending the Tactical Debrief to discuss this multi-faceted incident in its entirety to enhance future performance.

Therefore, I will direct that Detective Koenig, Sergeant Sanchez, and Officers Cervantes, Martinez, Bernd, Rodriguez, Zamorano, and Guerrero attend a Tactical Debrief and that the specific identified topics are discussed.

Note: Additionally, the Tactical Debrief shall also include the following mandatory discussion points:

- Use of Force Policy;
- Equipment Required/Maintained;
- Tactical Planning;
- Radio and Tactical Communication (including Code Six);
- Tactical De-Escalation;
- Command and Control; and,
- Lethal Force.

General Training Update (GTU)

On June 20, 2019, Officers Cervantes, Martinez, Bernd, and Rodriguez attended a GTU. All mandatory topics were covered including the Force Option Simulator.

Drawing/Exhibiting

Department policy relative to drawing and exhibiting a firearm is: *"An officer's decision to draw or exhibit a firearm should be based on the tactical situation and the officer's reasonable belief there is a substantial risk that the situation may escalate to the point where*

deadly force may be justified" (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume No. 1, Section 556.80)

Officer Cervantes

According to Officer Cervantes, he did not recall exactly when he drew his service pistol. However, he stated he drew his service pistol because he believed Medina had a box cutter and the situation could escalate to the use of deadly force. Additionally, Officer Cervantes believed he drew his service pistol out to a low-ready position.

Officer Cervantes recalled,

I believe it was once, in my mind, I felt that the situation could escalate to a use of deadly force, and because he had a box cutter and we were trying to give him commands, I believe I unholstered. And I was at the low-ready, I believe, too in case.¹¹

I believe I unholstered after I was already to the -- when I had already moved to the left and I was already in like in that position for a few seconds. Yeah.¹²

Well, yeah. I -- I believe that's -- I believe that's when we were, or I was unholstered. And because I believed at that point, he was going to try to pull out his weapon and try to harm me. Well, being based on the comments of call, I thought it was going to be a sharp object, possibly a razor blade, or most likely, the box cutter. So because I was looking for a box cutter, I thought about a yellow box cutter because I was told it was yellow. And so I thought he was going to harm one of us. And so I told the probationer to, who was on my side, to get ready with the less lethal, and -- and I was, I believe, I was -- I unholstered at the low-ready, and then -- and then so then at some point, he moves. He -- he -- I thought -- I guess he found what he was looking for, and I thought it was like the box cutter."¹³

Officer Martinez

According to Officer Martinez he deployed out of the passenger side of his police vehicle and was the cover officer. He drew his service pistol immediately upon exiting his police vehicle based on his knowledge from speaking with Alaniz and Belhadi, as well as the comments of the call, which had informed him that Medina was armed with a yellow box cutter. Officer Martinez believed the tactical situation could escalate to the use of deadly force.

¹¹ Officer Cervantes, Page 25, lines 10-15.

¹² Officer Cervantes, Page 26-27, lines 23-25 and 1.

¹³ Officer Cervantes, Page 30, lines 5-9 and 12-24.

Officer Martinez recalled,

"We deployed. I immediately unholstered. I unholstered based on the tactical situation. I knew that from two victims that this guy was armed with a yellow box cutter."¹⁴

Based on the situation, you know, we were stopped, I wanted -- I knew that he was possibly armed. He was not armed at when I saw him, but based on the radio calls, he was armed with a box cutter. That's why I deployed my weapon, and then I knew from communication with the backup unit, and -- and I mention it in there that does somebody have a 40?"¹⁵

I felt like I immediately unholstered based on the tactical situation."¹⁶

Based on the tactical situation, I had reasonable belief that the situation could escalate to a use of deadly force. And the comments of the call said he was armed with the yellow box cutter. And even though we didn't see it on him, he could be conceal -- concealing it."¹⁷

Officer Bernd

According to Officer Bernd, he had received information from Officers Cervantes and Martinez that Medina had previously chased two victims with a weapon and had attempted to commit an Assault with a Deadly Weapon. Due to the nature of the call, a man armed with a knife, as well as his observation that Medina was not completely complying with the commands being given by Officers Cervantes and Martinez, he drew his service pistol to a low-ready position.

Officer Bernd recalled,

"They were telling him to stop, put your hands up. Suspect was kind of complying, kind of dropping his hands, you know."¹⁸

Due to the nature of the call, the fact that he was armed with a knife, and he wasn't completely complying."¹⁹

They had said that they met with two of the PR's and they both had told them that he did chase them with a weapon."²⁰

¹⁴ Officer Martinez, Page 9-10, lines 25 and 1-3.

¹⁵ Officer Martinez, Page 24, lines 18-24.

¹⁶ Officer Martinez, Page 41, lines 13-14.

¹⁷ Officer Martinez, Page 49, lines 13-18.

¹⁸ Officer Bernd, Page 13-14, lines 24-25 and 1.

¹⁹ Officer Bernd, Page 14, lines 11-13.

²⁰ Officer Bernd, Page 32-33, lines 24-25 and 1.

Officer Zamorano

According to Officer Zamorano, upon her arrival at Medina's location, she drew her service pistol after exiting her police vehicle based on the comments of the radio call, a man armed with a weapon chasing people, and due to the situation potentially leading to the use of deadly force.

Officer Zamorano recalled,

"And then we both unholstered. Due to the comments of the radio call, it said that there was a 415 man with a knife chasing after people, possibly already cut somebody, and we knew he was armed with a weapon, so I knew that that was -- could lead to deadly force, so I unholstered my weapon."²¹

Immediately when I exited my vehicle."²²

Officer Guerrero

According to Officer Guerrero, she drew her service pistol to a low-ready position after she heard gunfire.

Officer Guerrero recalled,

"And then when I heard the gunshots, that's when I unholster. And then I started walking more toward -- I saw him fall, so I started moving towards where the suspect was."²³

It was when I heard the -- the beanbag. That's when I unholster. And then the shotgun went off I want to say around the same time."²⁴

In this case, the UOFRB conducted a thorough review evaluating the reasonableness of Officers Cervantes, Martinez, and Bernd's Drawing/Exhibiting. The UOFRB noted that Medina had attempted to assault both Victims Alaniz and Belhadi with a box cutter, both of whom avoided harm only by fleeing from Medina. Medina's actions presented a potential deadly threat to the community as well as responding officers.

The UOFRB conducted a diligent and individual assessment of each officer's articulation regarding their decision to draw/exhibit their service pistols. The UOFRB considered that Officers Cervantes and Martinez responded to multiple radio calls that indicated Medina was armed with a box cutter or razor blade. Upon their arrival, they met with both Alaniz and Belhadi who confirmed that Medina was armed with a box cutter and had attempted to assault them. Officer Bernd, who had responded to the radio call to assist Officers Cervantes and Martinez, also had knowledge of the comments of the radio calls and was informed by Officer

²¹ Officer Zamorano, Page 10, lines 13-18.

²² Officer Zamorano, Page 35, lines 2-3.

²³ Officer Guerrero, Page 9, lines 21-24.

²⁴ Officer Guerrero, Page 14, lines 20-22.

Martinez of Medina's aggressive actions relayed by Alaniz and Belhadi. The UOFRB noted that upon encountering Medina, Officers Cervantes, Martinez, and Bernd believed Medina was armed with a box cutter and observed he was not immediately complying with commands to place himself on the ground.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officers Cervantes, Martinez, and Bernd, while faced with similar circumstances, would reasonably believe that there was a substantial risk that the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified.

Therefore, I find Officers Cervantes, Martinez, and Bernd's Drawing/Exhibiting to be In-Policy, No Further Action.

In this case, the UOFRB conducted a thorough review in evaluating the reasonableness of Officers Zamorano and Guerrero's Drawing/Exhibiting. The UOFRB noted that Officers Zamorano and Guerrero were aware of the comments of the multiple radio calls indicating Medina was armed with a weapon.

The UOFRB conducted a diligent and individual assessment of each officer's articulation regarding their decision to draw/exhibit their service pistols. The UOFRB noted, upon her arrival at scene, Officer Zamorano drew her service pistol immediately upon exiting her police vehicle. Officer Zamorano believed Medina may be armed with a weapon based on the comments of the radio calls and believed the tactical situation may escalate to the use of deadly force. The UOFRB also considered that Officer Guerrero was initially designated by Officer Zamorano as the less-lethal cover officer while enroute to the call. Officer Guerrero drew her service pistol immediately after she heard gunfire, believing there was an immediate danger to the officers and the tactical situation could escalate to the use of deadly force.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officers Zamorano and Guerrero, while faced with similar circumstances, would reasonably believe that there was a substantial risk that the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified.

Therefore, I find Officers Zamorano and Guerrero's Drawing/Exhibiting to be In-Policy, No Further Action.

Use of Force – General²⁵

It is the policy of this Department that personnel may use only that force which is "objectively reasonable" to:

²⁵ Special Order No. 4, 2020 – Policy on the Use of Force - Revised, was adopted by the Department on February 5, 2020, after this incident occurred.

- *Defend themselves;*
- *Defend others;*
- *Effect an arrest or detention;*
- *Prevent escape; or,*
- *Overcome resistance*

The Department examines reasonableness using Graham v. Connor and from the articulated facts from the perspective of a Los Angeles Police Officer with similar training and experience placed in generally the same set of circumstances. In determining the appropriate level of force, officers shall evaluate each situation in light of facts and circumstances of each particular case. Those factors may include, but are not limited to:

- *The seriousness of the crime or suspected offense;*
- *The level of threat or resistance presented by the subject;*
- *Whether the subject was posing an immediate threat to officers or a danger to the community;*
- *The potential for injury to citizens, officers or subjects;*
- *The risk or apparent attempt by the subject to escape;*
- *The conduct of the subject being confronted (as reasonably perceived by the officer at the time);*
- *The amount of time and any changing circumstances during which the officer had to determine the type and amount of force that appeared to be reasonable;*
- *The availability of other resources;*
- *The training and experience of the officer;*
- *The proximity or access of weapons to the subject;*
- *Officer versus subject factors such as age, size, relative strength, skill level, injury/exhaustion and number officers versus subjects; and,*
- *The environmental factors and/or other exigent circumstances. (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 556.10)*

Less-Lethal Use of Force

It is the policy of this Department that personnel may use only that force which is "objectively reasonable" to:

- *Defend themselves;*
- *Defend others;*
- *Effect an arrest or detention;*
- *Prevent escape; or,*
- *Overcome resistance (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 556.10).*

Whenever practicable, officers shall exercise de-escalation techniques to resolve potential use of force incidents and seek voluntary compliance from suspects/subjects.

The courts have held that Less-Lethal force options are “capable of inflicting significant pain and may cause serious injury.” Therefore, consistent with the Department’s Use of Force Policy, Less-Lethal force options are only permissible when:

- *An officer reasonably believes the suspect or subject is violently resisting arrest or poses an immediate threat of violence or physical harm.*

Less-Lethal force options shall not be used for a suspect or subject who is passively resisting or merely failing to comply with commands. Verbal threats of violence or mere non-compliance by a suspect do not alone justify the use of Less-Lethal force.

An officer may use the Beanbag Shotgun as a reasonable force option to control a suspect when the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others.

For tactical and weapon retention purposes, the recommended deployment range for the Beanbag Shotgun is five feet to 45 feet. The primary target area is the navel area or belt line, but officers may target the suspect’s arms, hands or legs when practicable (Los Angeles Police Department Use of Force Tactics Directive No. 6.3, Beanbag Shotgun –July 2018).

Officer Rodriguez – Beanbag Shotgun, one super sock round in an easterly direction from an approximate distance of 19 feet.

According to Officer Rodriguez, he observed Medina arm himself with a knife and begin charging at the officers. As Medina approached Officers Martinez and Bernd, Officer Rodriguez targeted Medina’s navel area and discharged one round from his beanbag shotgun due to Medina not listening to commands and posing a threat to Officers Martinez and Bernd. Officer Rodriguez believed Medina was approximately five to seven feet away from Officers Martinez and Bernd when Officer Rodriguez fired the beanbag round and deemed that Medina would have caused serious bodily harm to the officers had he not taken action. Officer Rodriguez stated that when Medina charged towards the officers, there was no opportunity to provide Medina a use of force warning

Officer Rodriguez recalled,

“Once I saw him starting to charge, I beanbagged [sic] him due to the fact that he -- he posed a threat to my partner and Officer Martinez. I wasn't -- I wasn't aware of a shot that was fired at that time due to the -- I just heard the beanbag round go off. Suspect was probably five, maybe seven feet away -- five to seven feet away from Officer Martinez and Officer Bernd when I shot the beanbag round.”²⁶

²⁶ Officer Rodriguez, Page 9, lines 13-17 and 20-23.

After -- after getting on, you know, the driver side of the vehicle, that's when I was -- I still had it on the frame and then he turned around and started charging. That's when I transitioned my finger over to the trigger -- trigger and then he got closer. He wasn't listening to commands, so I pulled the trigger once, firing one round. That's when suspect went down and he was taken into custody after.²⁷

No. The reason being is he started charge -- or he started running towards the passenger side, so at that -- at that point it wasn't feasible for us to give the warning and wait for him to kind of respond to the warning. So I didn't give a warning.²⁸

So I was saying, "Beanbag ready. Beanbag ready," as the suspect turned around. He took a couple steps -- probably two, three steps and then that's when he started, you know, charging at the officers. And that's when I fired the round.²⁹

My target zone is through like the navel area, kind of like the belt line. So the center mass basically.³⁰

Right before I discharged the rounds, he had already armed himself with the knife. He was a max of seven feet away from the officers on the passenger side of the vehicle. He had the knife in his left hand. Don't remember the position -- don't exactly remember the position of his hand. I remember having -- or him having it close to his body, but not like -- don't remember exactly what he did after I shot the -- or when he was charging at the officers. About seven feet away from the officers and then -- He had it in his left hand and like ready -- just ready to -- it seemed like he was ready to use it at that moment. Like when he was getting closer to the officers."³¹

In this case, the UOFRB conducted a thorough review in evaluating the reasonableness of Officer Rodriguez's Less-Lethal Use of Force. The UOFRB noted that Officer Rodriguez was aware of the comments of the call indicating Medina was armed with a box cutter or razor. Additionally, he was informed by Officers Cervantes and Martinez that Medina had attempted to assault Victims Alaniz and Belhadi with a box cutter. While enroute to the radio call, Officer Bernd had designated Officer Rodriguez as the less-lethal cover officer. Upon his arrival at scene, Officer Rodriguez deployed a beanbag shotgun and moved to the driver's side of Officer Cervantes and Martinez's police vehicle. The UOFRB considered Officer Rodriguez's attempt to direct Medina to his knees in Spanish, to which Medina did not respond. Additionally, the UOFRB noted, Medina aggressively reached into his rear waistband and armed himself with a box cutter. Medina charged towards Officers Martinez and Bernd armed with the box cutter, rapidly escalating the encounter and presenting an imminent lethal threat. Officer Rodriguez fired one beanbag round to stop the lethal threat posed to both Officers Martinez and Bernd. Officer Rodriguez assessed and immediately ceased firing after firing his only beanbag round.

²⁷ Officer Rodriguez, Page 21, lines 3-11.

²⁸ Officer Rodriguez, Page 22, lines 7-12.

²⁹ Officer Rodriguez, Page 23, lines 18-23.

³⁰ Officer Rodriguez, Page 24, 1-3.

³¹ Officer Rodriguez, Page 33-34, lines 14-24 and 2-5.

The UOFRB also considered the limited amount of time to give Medina a verbal warning prior to the discharging of the beanbag shotgun and that Medina charged at officers.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officer Rodriguez, while faced with similar circumstances, would believe that the same application of less-lethal force would be reasonable to protect themselves and others, and to effect Medina's arrest.

Therefore, I find Officer Rodriguez's Less-Lethal Use of Force to be objectively reasonable and In Policy, No Further Action.

Lethal Use of Force

Law enforcement officers are authorized to use deadly force to:

- *Protect themselves or others from what is reasonably believed to be an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury; or,*
- *Prevent a crime where the subject's actions place person(s) in imminent jeopardy of death or serious bodily injury; or,*
- *Prevent the escape of a violent fleeing felon when there is probable cause to believe the escape will pose a significant threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or others if apprehension is delayed. In this circumstance, officers shall, to the extent practical, avoid using deadly force that might subject innocent bystanders or hostages to possible death or injury (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume No.1, Section 556.10).*

Officer Bernd – .45 caliber, 1 round in a northeasterly direction from an approximate distance of 16 feet.

According to Officer Bernd, he observed Medina not fully complying with commands being provided by Officers Cervantes and Martinez, which included him continuing to drop his hands. Officer Bernd observed Medina reach behind his back into his rear waistband and drop an object on the floor. Medina picked up the item, which Officer Bernd recognized as a yellow box cutter. Medina immediately began to run straight towards Officer Bernd and Officer Martinez with the box cutter pointed at them. Officer Bernd believed that he and Officer Martinez would be seriously injured or killed. Officer Bernd fired one round from his service pistol as Medina charged towards them to defend his life and Officer Martinez's life. Officer Bernd stated Medina had closed to an unsafe distance and believed there was no time to redeploy or utilize any other options because Medina was closing the distance too quickly. Officer Bernd assessed after he fired and observed Medina had fallen to the ground, and was no longer posed a lethal threat.

Officer Bernd recalled,

"We -- I approached. I went up on the passenger side. I had my firearm out. They were giving him commands. At first he was kind of going along with it, not going along with it. All of a sudden he reached behind his back into his rear waistband. He pulled something out, dropped it on the ground, then he picked it back up. And at that time I recognized it to be the weapon that was described in the radio call. It was a yellow -- yellow box cutter. He pulled it out. He had it in his arm. We started giving him commands to stop, drop the weapon. He continued forward. At which point when he got to a point where I felt that that was an unsafe distance, I fired my weapon one time."³²

He was -- he was -- had his hands up and he started dropping them. And they were telling him, "Put your hands back up," and he just continued to drop his hands. At which time he went immediately to his rear waistband. He dug into his rear waistband, he came out with something, and it flew out of his hand and landed on the ground. We immediately -- everybody was giving him commands, "Stop. Put your hands back up." He bent down, he picked up the item, and he turned towards us. At which time I recognized it to be the yellow box cutter."³³

Like in a -- like he's gripping like a -- like holding a knife, I guess."³⁴

It's pretty fast. I mean, he reached in, and as he came back out, it falls out of his hand. At which time he turns and picks it up immediately."³⁵

Yeah. As he turned to come towards us -- the comments of the call did describe a yellow box cutter. At which time I saw it and I identified it as that box cutter. Yeah. As -- yeah. As he approached with it, he was coming towards us, yeah, I could see the blade. He's -- well, I'm on that side with Officer Martinez. So he's -- I can immediately see him next to me here and he's coming to -- on our side of the vehicle straight towards us."³⁶

There was no time. He was closing the distance too quickly."³⁷

He originally picks up the knife. He starts to turn and run, I guess, back southbound, and he takes a couple steps like that and just comes straight towards us at that point."³⁸

³² Officer Bernd, Page 6-7, lines 13-25 and 1-2.

³³ Officer Bernd, Page 16-17, lines 17-25 and 1-3.

³⁴ Officer Bernd, Page 17, lines 17-18.

³⁵ Officer Bernd, Page 18, lines 12-15.

³⁶ Officer Bernd, Page 19, lines 3-6, 12-14, and 21-24.

³⁷ Officer Bernd, Page 22, lines 7-8.

³⁸ Officer Bernd, Page 23, lines 12-15.

That myself or the officer standing next to me was going to be seriously injured or even killed. Getting stabbed by that -- by that -- the edged weapon that he was holding.³⁹

I stepped to the right when he started moving, so I covered him. I decided to shoot when he charged straight at me."⁴⁰

In this case, the UOFRB conducted a thorough review and analysis of the reasonableness of Officer Bernd's use of lethal force. The UOFRB took into consideration that Medina was armed with a box cutter and had aggressively attempted to assault two victims without provocation prior to the officers' arrival. Additionally, the UOFRB considered that Medina, according to his wife, had been suffering from hallucinations, though he had not yet been diagnosed at the time with mental illness.

Upon his arrival at scene, Officer Bernd drew his service pistol and took up a position on the driver's side of Officers Cervantes and Martinez police vehicle. Officer Bernd had designated himself as the lethal cover officer while his partner, Officer Rodriguez, would be the less-lethal cover officer. Officer Bernd observed as Medina failed to comply with commands being provided in both English and in Spanish by Officers Cervantes and Martinez to place himself on the ground. Medina suddenly and without warning, aggressively reached into his rear waistband and armed himself with a box cutter, escalating the incident.

The UOFRB considered the rapid speed in which Medina armed himself and began to charge at Officers Martinez and Bernd armed with the box cutter, which had the blade in the open position. The UOFRB also considered the minimal time in which officers had to make a decision, as well as the threat posed by Medina to the officers. Multiple officers, including Officer Bernd, attempted to order Medina to stop; however, he proceeded towards Officers Martinez and Bernd swiftly and in an aggressive manner. The UOFRB considered the presentation conducted by FID investigators, which included that within approximately 57 seconds upon arrival of the officers, Medina armed himself with the box cutter. The FID investigators also presented that Medina, while armed with box cutter, travelled approximately 16 feet in approximately two seconds, closing the distance to Officer Bernd.

The UOFRB also reviewed the incident and noted that Officer Bernd, in response to the imminent lethal threat presented by Medina's actions, fired one round from his service pistol. Officer Bernd ceased fire immediately after as he assessed and observed Medina fall to the ground, no longer posing a deadly threat. His assessment and the single shot (fire control) contributed to the lack of contagious fire that can occur during similar incidents. The UOFRB noted in their evaluation of his actions, although Officer Bernd used lethal force to defend both his life and Officer Martinez's life, he demonstrated composure under a highly tense and dynamic encounter while exercising notable fire control.

³⁹ Officer Bernd, Page 34-35, lines 20-22 and 25-1.

⁴⁰ Officer Bernd, Page 43, lines 16-18.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officers Bernd, would reasonably believe Medina's actions presented an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury and that the Use of Lethal Force would be objectively reasonable.

Therefore, I find Officer Bernd's Use of Lethal Force to be In Policy, No Further Action.

Additional/Equipment

Protocols Subsequent to a Categorical Use of Force – The investigation revealed Detective Koenig was the first supervisor at scene, and believed he was the Incident Commander. He was advised that Officer Bernd was the officer involved in the OIS and identified percipient witness officers to the OIS. He separated Officer Bernd and administered a PSS; however, he did not admonish the remaining officers and order them not to discuss the incident. This issue was brought to the attention of Captain R. Valois, Serial No. 30129, Commanding Officer, Northeast Area, who advised it was addressed through divisional training which was documented in Learning Management System (LMS). The Commanding Officer of Operations – Central Bureau (OCB) and the Director of the Office of Operations (OO) concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

Sergeant Sanchez, upon his arrival to the incident, identified percipient witness officers to the OIS and advised them to remain in place, but did not admonish them not to discuss the incident. Sergeant Sanchez then secured the scene and conducted an interview with a civilian witness who were desirous to leave the scene to catch a flight out of town. Sergeant Sanchez did not get another supervisor to monitor the percipient officers prior to the witness interview. This issue was brought to the attention of Captain Valois, who advised it was addressed through divisional training which was documented in LMS. The Commanding Officer of OCB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

BWV Activation - Officers Bernd, Rodriguez, Martinez, Zamorano, and Guerrero activated their BWV cameras shortly after turning the camera on from the powered off position, which did not allow the camera to record a full two-minute buffer. However, their BWVs were activated prior to the incident and captured the incident in its entirety.

An analysis by Northeast Area determined Officer Bernd had two prior BWV non-compliance incidents.⁴¹ This issue was brought to the attention of Captain Valois who advised it was addressed through the issuance of an Employee Comment Sheet and the generation of a Supervisory Action Item (SAI). The Commanding Officer of OCB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

An analysis by Northeast Area determined Officer Rodriguez had one prior BWV non-compliance incident.⁴² This issue was brought to the attention of Captain Valois who advised it

⁴¹ Officer Bernd's two prior non-compliance incidents were a late activation and a failure to tag incident.

⁴² Officer Rodriguez' prior non-compliance incident was a late activation, which occurred during his BWV 90-day transition period.

was addressed through the issuance of an Employee Comment Sheet and the generation of a SAI. The Commanding Officer of OCB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

An analysis by Northeast Area determined Officer Martinez had one prior BWV non-compliance incident.⁴³ This issue was brought to the attention of Captain Valois who advised it was addressed through the issuance of an Employee Comment Sheet, and the generation of a SAI. The Commanding Officer of OCB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

An analysis by Northeast Area determined Officer Zamorano had two prior BWV non-compliance incidents.⁴⁴ This issue was brought to the attention of Captain Valois who advised it was addressed through the issuance of an Employee Comment Sheet, and the generation of a SAI. The Commanding Officer of OCB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

An analysis by Northeast Area determined Officer Guerrero had no prior BWV non-compliance incidents. On the day of the incident, Officer Guerrero was a probationary officer assigned to the field for approximately four weeks and was within the 90-day BWV procedures transition period. This issue was brought to the attention of Captain Valois who advised it was addressed through the issuance of an Employee Comment Sheet and the generation of a SAI. The Commanding Officer of OCB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

Sergeant Sanchez did not activate his BWV camera until he arrived at scene which resulted in his Code Three response being captured by the two- minute buffer without audio. A review of Sergeant Sanchez' Sergeant's Daily Report revealed that he noted the late BWV activation. An analysis by Northeast Area determined Sergeant Sanchez had no prior BWV non-compliance incidents. This issue was brought to the attention of Captain Valois who advised this was addressed through the issuance of an Employee Comment Sheet and the generation of a SAI. The Commanding Officer of OCB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

Watch Commander's Daily Report – The investigation revealed that the Northeast Patrol Division Watch Commander's Daily Report for this incident, as well as multiple Sergeant's Daily Reports, contained minor deviations regarding the documentation of notifications and the separation and monitoring of officers.

The Watch Commander Daily Report of Lieutenant K. Green, Serial No. 31567, Northeast Patrol Division, did not document the separation and monitoring of Officer Rodriguez.

⁴³ Officer Martinez' prior non-compliance incident was a non-activation.

⁴⁴ Officer Zamorano's prior non-compliance incidents were a non-documented test and a failure to tag incident, both of which occurred during her BWV 90-day transition period.

Sergeant Arellano's Sergeant's Daily Report noted that Officer Rodriguez was picked up for a walk-through at 1900 hours; however, no walk-through was conducted with Officer Rodriguez.

Sergeant Mejia's Sergeant's Daily Report indicated she monitored Officers Zamorano and Guerrero until she was relieved by FID; however, no end time was indicated.

The Supervisor Daily Report of Detective R. Castaneda, Serial No. 26722, Northeast Area, indicated that he also monitored Officer Guerrero from 2045 hours to 2230 hours, until he was relieved by FID.

These issues were brought to the attention of Captain Valois, who advised that they were addressed through an Informal Meeting with Lieutenant Green, Detective Castaneda, and Sergeants Arellano and Mejia. The Commanding Officer of OCB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

Digital In-Car Video System (DICVS) – Northeast Patrol Division police vehicles were equipped with DICVS.

The DICVS for Officers Bernd and Rodriguez, and Officers Zamorano and Guerrero captured the OIS.

The DICVS for Officers Cervantes and Martinez captured the discharge of the Beanbag Shotgun.

Body Worn Video (BWV) – Northeast Patrol Division patrol officers were equipped with BWV.

Officer Bernd and Martinez' BWVs captured the Officer Involved Shooting, as well as the beanbag round striking Medina.

Officer Rodriguez and Cervantes' BWVs captured Medina arming himself, and the deployment of the beanbag shotgun.

Officer Guerrero and Zamorano's BWVs captured the handcuffing of Medina.

Additional Northeast Patrol Division uniformed police officers activated their BWV while enroute to the incident; however, none captured any of the OIS.


Outside Video – Force Investigation Division investigators obtained two exterior camera views from 3851 Edenhurst Avenue; however, neither captured the OIS. Force Investigation Division investigators also obtained two exterior cameras surveillance footage from 3841 Edenhurst Avenue. One of the cameras captured the OIS from a distance.

Force Investigation Division investigators obtained cellular phone video filmed by Victim Belhadi. The video captured the Officer-Involved Shooting. Force Investigation Division

investigators obtained cellular phone video filmed by Victim Alaniz. The video did not capture the OIS.

Force Investigation Division investigators received a clip of surveillance video from an exterior camera on the porch of 3878 Edenhurst Avenue. The video depicted a metal rod thrown onto the porch, then Medina entered the porch area and utilized a different metal rod to overhead strike the front of the residence. Medina then left the porch and headed toward the street.

Respectfully,






MICHEL R. MOORE
Chief of Police

Date: 4-2-20

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT
USE OF FORCE REVIEW BOARD REPORT

INC No. 026-19	CF No.	DR No.
SHOOTING		

REVIEW BOARD INFORMATION

Location of Incident 3865 Edenhurst Ave, Los Angeles	RD 1123	Date of Incident June 06, 2019	Date and Time of Board Review March 16, 2020 1130 Hours
Chair Assistant Chief B. Girmala, Serial No. 24916	Signature of Approving Board Members:		
Member (Office Representative) Commander M. Rimkunas, Serial No. 32211			
Member (Police Sciences and Training Bureau) Commander R. Flores, Serial No. 30995			
Member (Bureau) Deputy Chief V. Palazzolo, Serial No. 27433			
Member (Peer) Officer T. Onyshko, Serial No. 38337			
Presenting Commanding Officer Captain R. Valois, Serial No. 30129			
Notes:			
Additional Considerations:			
<p style="text-align: center;">RECEIVED APR 16 2020 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL</p>			
Modification to Present Policy, Practices or Training:			
<p style="text-align: right;">2020 APR -3 AM 8:21 RECEIVED POLICE COMMISSION</p> <p>■ COP Date Signed: <u>4.2.20</u></p> <p>□ PC Date Submitted: _____</p>			

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Guerrero, Amelia		Serial No. 43797	Rank/Class Police Officer I	Incident No. 026-19
Length of Employment 0 years, 7 months		Current Division Northeast	Time in Current Division 0 years, 1 month	
Use of Force Review Board		Chief of Police	Police Commission	
Tactics <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		Tactics <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		Tactics <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Lethal Use of Force <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Lethal Use of Force <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Lethal Use of Force <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Less-Lethal Use of Force <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Less-Lethal Use of Force <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Less-Lethal Use of Force <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
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Unintentional Discharge <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		Unintentional Discharge <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		Unintentional Discharge <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
Other Issues <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Other Issues <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Other Issues <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)

Notes:

JA BUBZ

**Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/
Administrative Disapproval Finding**

- ☐ Extensive Retraining
☐ Notice to Correct Deficiencies
☐ Personnel Complaint
☐ Employee's Work History Reviewed

Notes:

***A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.**

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Zamorano, Jessica		Serial No. 40411	Rank/Class Police Officer III	Incident No. 026-19
Length of Employment 9 years, 3 month		Current Division Northeast	Time in Current Division 1 year, 4 months	
Use of Force Review Board		Chief of Police		Police Commission
Tactics <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		Tactics <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		Tactics <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
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Less-Lethal Use of Force <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Less-Lethal Use of Force <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Less-Lethal Use of Force <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
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Unintentional Discharge <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		Unintentional Discharge <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		Unintentional Discharge <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
Other Issues <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Other Issues <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Other Issues <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)

Notes: (1) Blame

**Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/
Administrative Disapproval Finding**

- ☐ Extensive Retraining
☐ Notice to Correct Deficiencies
☐ Personnel Complaint
☐ Employee's Work History Reviewed

Notes:

*A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Rodriguez, Daniel		Serial No. 43547	Rank/Class Police Officer I	Incident No. 026-19
Length of Employment 1 year, 1 month		Current Division Northeast		Time in Current Division 0 years, 8 months

Use of Force Review Board	Chief of Police	Police Commission
<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval	<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval	<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Other Issues</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)

Notes: JAZUAB2

<u>Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint <input type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed	Notes:
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***A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.**

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Bernd, Paul		Serial No. 36841	Rank/Class Police Officer III	Incident No. 026-19
Length of Employment 16 years, 1 month		Current Division Northeast	Time in Current Division 10 years, 7 months	

Use of Force Review Board	Chief of Police	Police Commission
<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval	<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval	<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Other Issues</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)

Notes: JAB4062

<u>Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint <input type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed	Notes:
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***A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.**


Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Martinez, Eddie		Serial No. 36860	Rank/Class Police Officer II	Incident No. 026-19
Length of Employment 15 years, 7 months	Current Division Northeast		Time in Current Division 8 years, 10 months	

Use of Force Review Board	Chief of Police	Police Commission
<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval	<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval	<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Other Issues</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)

Notes: SA 3492

<u>Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint <input type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed	Notes:
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***A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.**

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Cervantes, Antonio		Serial No. 36807	Rank/Class Police Officer II	Incident No. 026-19
Length of Employment 16 years, 2 months		Current Division Northeast		Time in Current Division 0 years, 8 months
Use of Force Review Board		Chief of Police		Police Commission
Tactics <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		Tactics <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		Tactics <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Lethal Use of Force <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Lethal Use of Force <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Lethal Use of Force <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Less-Lethal Use of Force <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Less-Lethal Use of Force <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Less-Lethal Use of Force <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Non-Lethal Use of Force <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Non-Lethal Use of Force <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Non-Lethal Use of Force <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Unintentional Discharge <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		Unintentional Discharge <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		Unintentional Discharge <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
Other Issues <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Other Issues <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Other Issues <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Notes:  34962				
Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint		Notes:		
<input type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed				

***A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.**